Ethical naturalism

Ethical naturalism (also called moral naturalism or naturalistic cognitivistic definism) is the meta-ethical view which claims that: Ethical naturalism (also called moral naturalism or naturalistic cognitivistic definism) is the meta-ethical view which claims that: It is important to distinguish the versions of ethical naturalism which have received the most sustained philosophical interest, for example, Cornell realism, from the position that 'the way things are is always the way they ought to be', which few ethical naturalists hold. Ethical naturalism does, however, reject the fact-value distinction: it suggests that inquiry into the natural world can increase our moral knowledge in just the same way it increases our scientific knowledge. Indeed, proponents of ethical naturalism have argued that humanity needs to invest in the science of morality, a broad and loosely defined field that uses evidence from biology, primatology, anthropology, psychology, neuroscience, and other areas to classify and describe moral behavior. Ethical naturalism encompasses any reduction of ethical properties, such as 'goodness', to non-ethical properties; there are many different examples of such reductions, and thus many different varieties of ethical naturalism. Hedonism, for example, is the view that goodness is ultimately just pleasure. Ethical naturalism has been criticized most prominently by ethical non-naturalist G. E. Moore, who formulated the open-question argument. Garner and Rosen say that a common definition of 'natural property' is one 'which can be discovered by sense observation or experience, experiment, or through any of the available means of science.' They also say that a good definition of 'natural property' is problematic but that 'it is only in criticism of naturalism, or in an attempt to distinguish between naturalistic and nonnaturalistic definist theories, that such a concept is needed.' R. M. Hare also criticised ethical naturalism because of its fallacious definition of the terms 'good' or 'right' explaining how value-terms being part of our prescriptive moral language are not reducible to descriptive terms: 'Value-terms have a special function in language, that of commending; and so they plainly cannot be defined in terms of other words which themselves do not perform this function'. When it comes to the moral questions that we might ask, it can be difficult to argue that there is not necessarily some level of meta-ethical relativism – and failure to address this matter is criticized as ethnocentrism.