Ousia

Autocephaly recognized universally de facto, by some Autocephalous Churches de jure. Canonicity mostly recognized:Ousia (/ˈuːziə, ˈuːsiə, ˈuːʒə, ˈuːʃə/; Greek: οὐσία) is a philosophical and theological term, originally used in Ancient Greek philosophy, then later in Christian theology. It was used by various Ancient Greek philosophers, like Plato and Aristotle, as a primary designation for philosophical concepts of essence or substance. In contemporary philosophy, it is analogous to English concepts of being and ontic. In Christian theology, the concept of θεία ουσία (divine essence) is one of the most important doctrinal concepts, central to the development of trinitarian doctrine. It must be regarded as certain that the council, which condemned Paul, rejected the term homoousios; but, naturally, only in a false sense, used by Paul; not, it seems, because he meant by it a unity of Hypostasis in the Trinity (so St. Hilary), but because he intended, by it, a common essence, out of which both Father and Son proceeded, or which it divided between them — so St. Basil and St. Athanasius; but the question is not clear. The objectors to the Nicene doctrine in the fourth century made copious use of this disapproval of the Nicene word by a famous council. Ousia (/ˈuːziə, ˈuːsiə, ˈuːʒə, ˈuːʃə/; Greek: οὐσία) is a philosophical and theological term, originally used in Ancient Greek philosophy, then later in Christian theology. It was used by various Ancient Greek philosophers, like Plato and Aristotle, as a primary designation for philosophical concepts of essence or substance. In contemporary philosophy, it is analogous to English concepts of being and ontic. In Christian theology, the concept of θεία ουσία (divine essence) is one of the most important doctrinal concepts, central to the development of trinitarian doctrine. The Ancient Greek term Ousia was translated in Latin as essentia or substantia, and hence in English as essence or substance. The term οὐσία is an Ancient Greek noun, formed on the feminine present participle of the verb εἰμί, eimí, i.e., 'to be, I am'. In Latin, it was translated as essentia or substantia. Ancient Roman philosopher Seneca and rhetorician Quintilian used essentia as equivalent for οὐσία, while Apuleius rendered οὐσία both as essentia or substantia. In order to designate οὐσία, Early Christian theologian Tertullian favored the use of substantia over essentia, while Augustine of Hippo and Boethius took the opposite stance, preferring the use of essentia as designation for οὐσία. Some of the most prominent Latin authors, like Hilary of Poitiers, noted that those variants were often being used with different meanings. Some modern authors also point out that the Greek term οὐσία is properly translated as essentia (essence), while substantia has a wider spectrum of meanings. From οὐσία (essence), philosophical and theological term οὐσιότης (essentiality) was also derived. It was used by Platonists, like Alcinous, as designation for one of the basic properties of divinity or godhead. Aristotle defined protai ousiai (πρῶται οὐσίαι), 'primary substances', in the Categories as that which is neither said of nor in any subject, e.g., 'this human' in particular, or 'this ox'. The genera in biology and other natural kinds are substances in a secondary sense, as universals, formally defined by the essential qualities of the primary substances; i.e., the individual members of those kinds. In Book IV of Metaphysics Aristotle explores the nature and attributes of being (ousia). Aristotle divides the things that there are, or 'beings,' into categories. Aristotle calls these substances and argues that there are many senses in which a thing may be said 'to be' but it is related to one central point and is ambiguous. Aristotle states that there are both primary and secondary substances. In Categories Aristotle argues that primary substances are ontologically based and if the primary substances did not exist then it would be impossible for other things to exist. The other things are regarded as the secondary substances (also known as accidents). Secondary substances are thus ontologically dependent on substances. In Metaphysics, Aristotle states that everything which is healthy is related to health (primary substance) as in one sense because it preserves health and in the other because it is capable of it. Without the primary substance (health) we would not be able to have the secondary substances (anything related to health). While all the secondary substances are deemed 'to be' it is in relation to the primary substance.